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This article offers a theoretical explanation for what has been described as Arctic ‘ex-
ceptionalism’ - the successful effort to maintain cooperation in the region despite inter-
nal competition for resources and territory, and to compartmentalize Arctic relations 
from external geopolitical tensions. By using an English School approach to understand 
the Arctic, the authors describe how Arctic international society has been deliberately 
negotiated in a way that promotes cooperation between Arctic states, and that a rules- 




“The fate of each state depends on its responses to what other 
states do. The possibility that conflict will be conducted by force 
leads to competition in the arts and the instruments of force. Com-
petition produced a tendency toward the sameness of the competi-
tors… Contending states imitate the military innovations contrived 
by the country of greatest capability and ingenuity. And so the 
weapons of major contenders, and even their strategies, begin to 
look much the same all over the world.” (Waltz 1979, 127) 
 
In his writing on the nature of international politics, Kenneth Waltz was correct to note 
that states are motivated by a desire to survive and that the international balance of 
power was especially important in understanding and explaining how conflict could 
arise between states or blocs of states. Throughout the history of the state system, there 
has been a preoccupation with rivalry, competition, and how states perceive each other, 
with the majority of commentary on international politics pointing out the ever-present 
dangers of conflict. What is equally important to note about international politics is that 
states have consciously and willingly negotiated various types of international and re-
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gional order in an effort to mitigate the impact of an anarchic international system and 
have aligned themselves with either informal or formal organizational structures de-
signed specifically to promote cooperation between states. 
While it is true that the international system is anarchic in its structure and that 
states tend to behave as self-interested actors, the history of international politics has 
seen examples of internationalism, cooperation, and multilateralism, often characterized 
by states seeking opportunities to combine resources and work towards ensuring their 
survival through means other than conflict or coercion. Further, it is imperative to dif-
ferentiate between the establishment and functioning of international order and various 
regional orders that have emerged at various times in world history, as regional orders 
tend to reflect the specific interests of like-minded states in a more concentrated way. 
Studies in regional order often focus on the European historical example, but more re-
cently, regional order has been the subject of more intense scholarly study and how the-
se regional orders relate to the larger international or world order (see Fawcett and Hur-
rell 1996). Much of this increased focus on regionalism and regional order comes as a 
result of the growth in regional cooperation and initiatives focused either on security or 
economic issues, such as NATO, NAFTA, the European Union, ASEAN, OAS, and 
others.1 
The region that has received far more attention since the end of the Cold War 
has been the Arctic. Although the Arctic states are at odds in other parts of the world, 
notably over Russia’s annexation of Crimea and its sponsorship of ongoing conflict in 
Eastern Ukraine, there has been a sense that the Arctic is somehow a ‘unique’ or ‘ex-
ceptional’ region in international affairs. There has been very minimal spillover to date 
in regional political relations; indeed, there have been advancements in formal coopera-
tion in the past three years. The question has been asked: can Arctic politics be ex-
plained through the traditional lenses used to understand and explain international af-
fairs? 
This paper argues that the Arctic regional order is exceptional insofar as Arctic 
states and those states with involvement in the regional have worked to negotiate an 
order and balance of power predicated on norms such as cooperation and multilateral-
ism. The establishment of an Arctic international society has seen great powers and 
smaller powers come together to form an order aimed at promoting norms and institu-
tions not seen elsewhere in the world, though this paper notes that the Arctic is not im-
mune from the possibility of war and conflict. By using an English School approach to 
understand the Arctic, we contend that Arctic international society was deliberately ne-
gotiated in a way that promotes cooperation between Arctic states, but that this order 
can be disrupted if Arctic international society does not take conscious steps to maintain 
a strong institutional framework that protects Arctic internationalism.  
 
                                                
1 Respectively, North Atlantic Treaty Organization; North American Free Trade Agreement; Association of Southeast 
Asian Nations; and Organization of American States.  
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Negotiating Regional Order 
 
One of the lasting impacts of Arctic romanticism has been a tendency of international 
relations scholars to apply theoretical schools of thought from the field to current Arctic 
politics. Oran Young summarizes this trend by arguing: 
 
“There is a pronounced streak of romanticism in the thinking of many 
who take an interest in the Arctic, an attitude that encourages those af-
fected by it to focus on the exotic and even unique properties of the 
physical, biological, and human systems of the region…Understandable 
as the resultant Arctic exceptionalism may be, it has the effect of obscur-
ing our vision of a range of issues that are both critical to various con-
stituencies in the Circumpolar North and of great interest to social scien-
tists as exemplars of concerns that are generic in the sense that they arise 
in every corner in the world.” (Young 1992, 13-14) 
 
In examining the way scholars have approached Arctic international relations in recent 
years, much of the focus has been placed on aspects of traditional security studies or on 
the human security aspects of debates, but few approaches have made significant pro-
gress in trying to understand why international politics in the Arctic region are insulated 
from trends elsewhere in the world, particularly given the states involved in Arctic af-
fairs, notably the United States and Russia.  
The English School of international relations emphasizes the role of interna-
tional society as a middle way of theorizing international affairs between the traditional 
realist conceptualizations of international politics, such as that presented by Waltz, and 
liberal or critical theoretical approaches that look at domestic-level or critical variables 
to understand global affairs. For the English School, the society of states is key to ex-
plaining state behavior, especially how states interact with one another; and more, the 
motives behind how and why states at times in history have willingly taken part in ro-
bust multilateral and cooperative regimes, and at others have worked together in a min-
imalist fashion. Robert Jackson summarizes the importance of international society as a 
conceptual tool for international relations by stating: 
 
“The conceptual key to international society is the manner in 
which sovereign states associate and relate: the character and mo-
dus operandi of their association and relations. It is formal in a 
significant way: it involves procedural standards of conduct, an es-
sential normative basis of which is international law. However, it 
is also substantive in an equally significant way as it involves the 
pragmatic encounters of the separate national interests of those 
same independent states which, although subject to international 
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law, are still free to lay down their own foreign policies.” (2000, 
102) 
 
According to the English School, states seek to ensure their survival and mitigate the 
effects of an anarchic international system by consenting to partake in a society of 
states. These societies differ in their normative frameworks and character based on a 
number of variables, including the great powers dominating the international system at a 
given time in history. The main motivator for states consenting to sacrifice elements of 
their independence and autonomy is their quest for survival, and according to English 
School theory, the ideal way for states to do this is to use international society as a 
means for establishing and maintaining order. 
One of the most important theoretical variables in identifying the degree to 
which states will work together in international society and the normative or institution-
al framework of a given society of states is the role of great powers. It is ultimately 
great powers that have the most influence in negotiating, implementing and enforcing 
order within international society, and the relations of these powers in various systemic 
structures, such as bipolar, multipolar, or unipolar, determines how strong and enduring 
order within a society of states will be. According to Hedley Bull, great powers face a 
series of options available to them in their considerations of order: 
 
“Great powers manage their relations with one another in the in-
terests of international order by (i) preserving the general balance 
of power, (ii) seeking to avoid or control crises in their relations 
with one another, and (iii) seeking to limit or contain wars among 
one another. They exploit their preponderance in relation to the 
rest of international society by (iv) unilaterally exploiting their lo-
cal preponderance, (v) agreeing to respect one another’s sphere of 
influence, and (vi) joint action.” (Bull 202, 200) 
 
Following Bull’s logic, great powers have the option to cooperate in a minimalist fash-
ion or a more robust fashion, should they choose to do so, in the interest of maintaining 
order among states. An important point to highlight is that international societies are not 
strictly global in character, and the decisions of states, especially great powers, regard-
ing establishing order via negotiation and the normative framework of a society of states 
also have consequences at the sub-global level. 
In recent years, English School scholars have given more attention to the dis-
tinction between an overarching ‘global’ international society and ‘sub-global’ or ‘re-
gional’ international societies. According to Yannis Stivachtis:  
 
“Opening the regional level of analysis might have serious impli-
cations for understanding institutions and norms like sovereignty, 
diplomacy, balance of power and others which exist and are per-
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formed at both global and regional level as, in many cases, regions 
form their own sub-global (regional) international societies which 
co-exist with global international society.” (2015, 69)  
 
It is therefore noteworthy to point out that, at any given time, there is both a global in-
ternational society as well as a series of regional international societies, themselves con-
sciously negotiated sub-global orders intended to better coordinate the relations between 
states and mitigate the effects of both anarchy, and possible global conflicts. Further, 
the institutions that form the normative framework of a regional international society 
need not be entirely consistent with those of global international society. Consequently, 
the relations between states at the global level may differ between those same states in 
regional interactions. 
With eight states, multiple Indigenous groups, multilateral institutions and an 
emerging governance regime, and vast interest from a number of states and institutions, 
the Arctic is most certainly an emerging example of a regional international society (see 
Weinert 2014). Stivachtis furthers this claim by stating: 
 
“Arctic international relations are a complex of political, econom-
ic, development and militaristic dimensions. Throughout the Cold 
War, the Arctic was a region of symbolic military competition be-
tween the United States and Soviet Union. However, post-Cold 
War conditions in conjunction with climate change have trans-
formed the Arctic into an important world region in the sense that 
states began to assert their claims of national sovereignty over are-
as previously considered inaccessible. This has had important im-
plications for the Arctic regional order.” (2015, 78) 
 
The case for discussing Arctic exceptionalism traditionally hinges more on arguments 
about the Arctic being insulated from other geopolitical and international issues, partic-
ularly involving conflict, than being seen as a unique zone of cooperation. While it may 
be true that no region can be totally insulated from other international or global trends, 
it can be the case that the Arctic is ‘exceptional’ to the extent that the states that com-
prise Arctic international society have intentionally negotiated a regional order predi-
cated on a more cooperative framework than they pursue with each other elsewhere, and 
have endeavored, implicitly, to compartmentalize relations there. The following section 
will explain in greater detail the normative composition of Arctic international society 
and the reasons state behavior in the region might look different, or exceptional.  
 
An Arctic International Society Emerges 
 
The establishment of an Arctic international society emerged, like many phenomena in 
contemporary international relations, at the time of the collapse of the Soviet Union. 
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The negotiation of the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy (AEPS) in 1991, and 
subsequently the establishment of the Arctic Council in 1996, are often pointed to as the 
beginning of regional state relations. However, its true origins are more closely tied to a 
1987 speech in Murmansk by Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev, to which the AEPS 
and Arctic Council, and many other foundational institutions of Arctic international 
society, were a response. It included six points: 
 
1. A nuclear-free zone in Northern Europe. 
2. Restricting naval activity in the Baltic, Northern, Norwegian and Greenland 
Seas, and extending confidence-building measures in these areas. 
3. Peaceful cooperation in developing the resources of the North, including 
knowledge exchange, with specific mention of “oil and gas deposits of the shelf 
of our northern seas”.  
4. The development of scientific cooperation in the Arctic, including “questions 
bearing on the interests of the indigenous population of the North…and the de-
velopment of cultural ties between northern peoples”. 
5. Cooperation in environmental protection. 
6. The development of the Northern Sea Route. 
 
Re-examining the speech, which further called for the Arctic to become a “zone of 
peace”, there is evidence of significant continuity in regional state interests and goals 
over the past thirty years. Although the international system has evolved, state interests 
in the Arctic have remained largely intact and have led to normative institutions predi-
cated on cooperation and multilateralism. These include: (1) efforts to maintain peace 
and stability in the region, echoed more contemporarily in the confidence-building ef-
forts attempted through the Arctic Chiefs of Defense Staff meetings (though suspended 
after only two gatherings in 2014 after the Crimea intervention); (2) the establishment in 
2015 and continuing efforts of an Arctic Coast Guard Forum; and (3) a premium placed 
on cooperation with regards to economic, scientific and environmentalist endeavors, 
manifested in the work of the Arctic Council, various scientific organizations, fishery 
regulations, the establishment of mandatory polar shipping guidelines, and the large 
number of other Arctic conferences and forums on a variety of topics. These interests 
have all been reiterated in the strategic objectives of the Arctic states as described in 
regional and national policies and speeches since 2008 (Heininen 2012), and clearly 
demonstrate a set of primary institutions within Arctic international society that are 
unique to the region and its particular political dynamics.   
The institutionalized, stable, and rules-based Arctic society of states has also 
successfully integrated world society variables, such as NGOs, indigenous groups, and 
global civil society. Arctic-based organizations founded in the early 1990s include the 
Northern Forum, the International Arctic Science Committee (IASC), the Inuit Circum-
polar Conference (now Council), the Barents Euro Arctic Council, and the University of 
the Arctic, alongside others. The AEPS, a Finnish initiative that included all eight states 
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with Arctic territory, also made, in retrospect, a transformational move by including 
Indigenous groups formally within the institution, a trend that was then replicated in the 
Arctic Council.  
If Russia and the Murmansk speech provided space for the development of an 
Arctic international society, it is Finland and Canada, both middle powers that are gen-
erally attributed with leading its formalization, at least in the 1990s (Huebert 1998; 
Keskitalo 2004; English 2013). This is consistent with Martin Wight’s view of the role 
middle powers play in the formation and conduct of societies of states (1978). It is no-
table that the United States played a limited role in the establishment of the Arctic 
Council, other than to circumscribe its mandate, such as the proscription on discussions 
of a military nature and defined financial contributions to the forum, at a time when the 
United States was trying to taper the proliferation and scope of international multilateral 
institutions (English 2013). Individual Americans, however, played key roles in region-
alization processes. U.S. government participation in the Arctic Council was very much 
a concession to Canadian appeals, and was contingent on the Council not dealing with 
matters of military security or demanding defined contributions, and the adoption of a 
consensus based decision-making structure (English 2013; Bloom 1999). The U.S. also 
conceded the inclusion of Indigenous organizations as Permanent Participants, and the 
mandate for sustainable development, although there was concern and skepticism about 
its implementation in practice. 
How can we explain the limited role assumed by the United States as an Arctic 
society emerged? The shared interests of Arctic states typically revolve around the soft 
security and low politics issues of the environment, science, and Indigenous and north-
ern peoples’ well-being. Environmental cooperation is not viewed by states through a 
lens of competition for relative gains; in fact, states are perceived to benefit from what-
ever efforts their neighbors make to protect their own environments, or contribute to 
scientific understanding, irrespective of their own efforts. Because environmental and 
scientific cooperation in the Arctic has taken shape largely through guidelines rather 
than binding agreements, there have been no economic or political costs imposed invol-
untarily. Within these circumstances, the United States has played a more muted role in 
Arctic politics than is the case in regions where territorial and economic competition is 
more fierce.   
 
Competition or Conflict 
 
Of course, many have argued that the Arctic is a theatre of fierce territorial and econom-
ic competition. A narrative of competition has dogged the Arctic region in the popular 
media, with suggestions that the Arctic states, and especially the Arctic Five littoral 
states (Canada, Denmark, Norway, Russia, and the United States) have been ‘racing’ to 
claim large swathes of extended continental shelf and exploit the large deposits of hy-
drocarbon and mineral resources. Where viewed as a zero-sum competition, claims of 
Arctic exceptionalism are exposed to significant skepticism. Theory, and history, sug-
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gest that states, especially great powers such as the United States and Russia, will at-
tempt to maximize their strategic and economic advantages when the opportunity pre-
sents itself, but will not make decisions that significantly increase the risk of conflict 
unless their survival is threatened. In the Arctic, where interests are largely compatible, 
this has meant developing a robust international society negotiated to uphold Arctic 
states’ interests based on a set of primary and secondary institutions that foster collabo-
ration and information sharing, while establishing a unique Arctic balance of power. 
When viewed through a lens of absolute gains, the five littoral Arctic states all stand to 
benefit from a stable, peaceful, and accessible ocean, whereas instability would threaten 
their economic and strategic advantages. 
The Arctic Ocean is best described, not as a newly opened ‘Wild West’ up for 
grabs, but as an ocean. Like the others, it is subject to the terms of the 1982 United Na-
tions Convention of the Law of the Sea.2 One of the most pertinent provision with re-
gards to Arctic governance has to do with submission of claims to the outer limit of 
continental shelf beyond the 200-nautical mile Exclusive Economic Zone. There is an 
unusually far extension of geologic shelf throughout the Arctic basin (Antrim 2017), 
meaning lots of shelf to claim for the Arctic states through the processes identified in 
UNCLOS, e.g. through the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf. 
Following media reports of a scramble for the Arctic following the Russian 
planting of a titanium flag on the sea bed at the geographical North Pole in August 
2007, the ‘Arctic Five’ states3 held a meeting in Ilulissat, Greenland, on 28 May 28, 
2008, to reassert their commitment to the existing “legal framework and to the orderly 
settlement of any possible overlapping claims” (Ilulissat Declaration 2008). Rather than 
the setting for a great power showdown, the Ilulissat Declaration demonstrated that the 
Arctic region had become exclusive, a club unto itself, in which the five littoral states 
stand to gain tremendously and seek to preserve their collective sovereignty and juris-
diction over the region, vis à vis other stakeholders. (see Jacobsen and Strandsbjerg’s 
article in this issue which analyses the Ilulissat Declaration as a desecuritization act).  
Forming a group or society of states concomitantly requires an identification of 
those who are not part of the club. China has previously called for the Arctic Ocean to 
be considered a “common heritage of mankind” (Zhuo 2010), and the EU Parliament 
called for an Antarctic-like Treaty to govern the region in 2008, to the dismay of the 
Arctic Five. Subsequently, criteria for Observership in the Arctic Council – a role with 
no inherent power – was devised to assess the extent to which “the applicant recognizes 
Arctic States’ sovereignty, sovereign rights” and understands that “an extensive legal 
framework applies to the Arctic Ocean including, notably, the Law of the Sea, and that 
this framework provides a solid foundation for responsible management of this ocean” 
(Arctic Council 2013). China, India, South Korea, Singapore, Japan and Italy, and with 
                                                
2 Although the United States is not a signatory to UINCLOS, it accepts most of the Law of the Sea, in-
cluding parts pertinent to the Arctic, as customary international law.  




some caveats the European Union4, met these provisions to the satisfaction of the Arctic 
states and were finally admitted as Observers in 2013. But the Arctic Council retains a 
strong dynamic of those who are in and those who are out. The most recent, May 2017, 
Agreement on Enhancing International Arctic Scientific Cooperation was ultimately 
negotiated between just the eight Arctic states despite the strong scientific interests and 
contributions in the region by other states and their nationals (see Greaves and Pomer-
ants article in this issue about ‘soft’ securitization and the Arctic Council). 
It is not only non-Arctic states who have been cast as outsiders of regional Arc-
tic society. There have been tensions with other members of the Arctic Council, namely 
Iceland, Finland, and Sweden, as well as some Indigenous Permanent Participants, 
when the Arctic Five have endeavored to meet, beginning but not ending with Ilulissat. 
More recently, the Arctic Five states issued a Declaration to Prevent Unregulated Fish-
ing in the Central Arctic Ocean, on July 16, 2015. Because the Central Arctic Ocean is 
High Seas, the Arctic Five do not have any authority to prevent others from fishing 
there, and did not assume any. However, Iceland called the move “unacceptable” 
(Quinn 2015) and summoned the respective Ambassadors to explain why Iceland had 
been left out. (Talks have since expanded to include Iceland, as well as China, the Eu-
ropean Union, Japan, and South Korea and negotiations will likely conclude in 2017.) 
What is most notable of this is the demonstration that in many Arctic affairs, 
Russia is a normal and even preeminent member of regional society, part of the upper 
tier, and not an outcast as is often described or would be expected based on its relation-
ship with the Western Arctic states elsewhere.   
 
The Manifestation of Exceptionalism 
 
Recent history affirms that the Arctic is exceptional, inasmuch as narratives of conflict 
or at least spillover, based on the confluence of antagonistic actors, an underdeveloped 
resource base, strategic location, and rapid change, have failed to be realized.  
Russia’s 2014 incursion into Crimea, and before that Georgia in 2008, has test-
ed the Arctic states’ resolve to maintain cooperative relations in the region whilst pursu-
ing sanctions elsewhere. Regional cooperation has proven resistant however. Rather 
than a dissolution of Arctic society, there has been ongoing investment into the devel-
opment of shared norms, rules and institutions in the past five years. These include: 
 
• The conclusion of three binding agreements negotiated under the auspices of the 
Arctic Council, including the 2011 Agreement on Cooperation on Aeronautical 
                                                
 
4 The European Union is a special case. In 2013, the Arctic Council “receive[d] the application of the EU 
for Observer status affirmatively”, but deferred a final decision, due to Canada’s concern over its seal 
products ban. Although this particular issue was resolved by the 2015 Ministerial, Russia then blocked 
full acceptance due to tensions related to sanctions in the Arctic region over Crimea. In practice, the EU 
enjoys all of the minimal benefits Observer status offers, as an ad hoc Observer.  
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and Maritime Search and Rescue in the Arctic; the 2013 Agreement on Coopera-
tion on Marine Oil Pollution, Preparedness and Response in the Arctic; and the 
2017 Agreement on Enhancing Arctic Scientific Cooperation. 
 
• The establishment of a Permanent Secretariat for the Arctic Council in Tromsø, 
Norway in 2013, which together with the two binding agreements marked a pro-
gression in the institutionalization and authority of the Council vis à vis the Arc-
tic states. 
 
• The adoption of a mandatory Polar Code, or International Code for Ships Opera-
tion in Polar Waters, under the auspices of the International Maritime Organiza-
tion (IMO) in 2014. 
 
• The establishment of an eight-party Arctic Coast Guard Forum in 2015 to coop-
erate at an operational level in the maritime Arctic. 
 
• A Declaration by the five littoral Arctic states Concerning the Prevention of Un-
regulated high Seas Fishing in the Central Arctic Ocean in July 2015, with nego-
tiations underway to extend an agreement to China, Japan, South Korea, Iceland, 
and the EU in 2017. 
 
The decision to compartmentalize relations within the Arctic from external events and 
factors has been a conscious one. Statements by various Arctic diplomats summarize the 
thinking: Canadian Senior Arctic Official Alison Leclaire asserted in October 2016 that 
“Canada and Russia have interests in the Arctic, including shared interests, hence the 
importance of engaging in interstate dialogue… despite differences on some issues, 
communication channels between Russia and Canada should remain open” (as quoted in 
TASS 2016). Norwegian Foreign Minister Børge Brende articulated in March 2017 that 
 
“Northern regions and cooperation in the Arctic is of high priority 
for Norway. Russia is an important partner and player in the Arc-
tic, and [the Arctic Dialogue conference in Arkhangelsk] provides 
a good frame for continuing the political dialogue with Russia re-
garding questions of common interests” (as quoted in Nilsen 
2017). 
 
Similarly, Russian President Vladimir Putin stated in March 2017 that “It is essential to 
preserve the Arctic as a territory of constructive dialogue, creation and cooperation on 
an equal basis…Russia sees no potential for conflicts in the Arctic Region” and interna-





Location, Location, Location 
 
The exceptionalism of Arctic society - the conscious effort to compartmentalize rela-
tions in the region - is less about idealism and more about shared interests. Events and 
phenomena that have proven destabilizing in other regions have not had the same effect 
on Arctic relations. This can be explained by fundamental differences in the Arctic re-
gion’s geography and demography, and the society that has evolved within it.  
 
Marine and Environmental Interests 
 
Perhaps most importantly from an international relations point of view is the fact that 
the Arctic region is oceans-based, as opposed to land-based. This, combined with other 
features of the Arctic including remoteness, sparseness, and extreme weather condi-
tions, has drastically reduced the flow of trade, people, and conflict – the issues that 
dominate regional relations in other parts of the world. It is no surprise, then, that for-
mal regional cooperation – the ‘procedural standards of conduct’ – have occurred pri-
marily around marine issues.5  
Marine matters are particularly well suited for and benefit from regional coop-
eration, because water boundaries are much more fluid, literally and figuratively. Envi-
ronmental matters are similar: political borders have little influence on the traversing of 
air, water, flora and fauna, or pollutants. The ocean-based Arctic region thus offers 




Another unique characteristic of Arctic international society is the influence and com-
position of its epistemic community. There is an unusual amount of political space for 
non-state actors, particularly Indigenous organizations, scientists/academics, and envi-
ronmental NGOs, perhaps because the state itself has generally had less of a presence in 
the Arctic.   
This uniqueness is perhaps best demonstrated in the structure of the Arctic 
Council, which in addition to its eight state members includes six Indigenous Permanent 
Participants, “created to provide for active participation and full consultation” (Arctic 
Council 2013). Permanent Participants are fully included in the Council’s executive 
meetings, Ministerials, Working Groups, and Task Forces. They do not have a vote per 
se, but as the Arctic Council is a consensus based organization, this has not had much 
significance. NGOs, scientists, and scientific organizations have also played a central 
                                                
5 Shipping, e.g. the 2015 Polar Code; SAR, e.g. 2011 Agreement on Aeronautical and Mari-time Search and Rescue 
in the Arctic; marine environment, e.g. 2013 Agreement on Cooperation on Marine Oil Pollution, Preparedness and 
Response; Coast Guards, e.g. 2015 Arc-tic Coast Guard Forum; fisheries, e.g. 2015 Oslo Declaration Concerning 
Prevention Un-regulated High Seas Fishing in the Central Arctic Ocean; and marine wildlife, e.g. 1973 Agreement on 
Conservation of Polar Bears.    
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role in the work of the Arctic Council, e.g. in the production of its reports, assessments, 
and guidelines.   
It can be argued that this diverse network of actors has played a stabilizing in-
fluence in regional society; there is strong path dependency towards the continuation of 
scientific, environmental, and Indigenous cooperation at various other levels, irrespec-
tive of the political ebbs and flows in state relations.  
 
Likelihood of Military Conflict  
 
The Arctic’s history and geography also reduce the likelihood of conventional military 
conflict in the region. On the first point, the relative sparsity of the Arctic population, 
and the late settlement by ethnic Europeans, means that there isn’t a recent history of 
territorial loss and boundary change across the region, at least on the part of nation-
states (for Indigenous peoples the view is quite different). This is in sharp contrast to the 
context of Russian aggression in Crimea and South Ossetia, which were both formerly 
part of the Soviet Union, host large ethnic Russian populations, and maintained close 
relations with Moscow following its collapse in 1991 and their absorption into Ukraine 
and Georgia, respectively. These are narrow, specific and predictable circumstances. 
Based on this pattern, the Baltic states have reasonable cause to fear a Russian incursion 
but not the Scandinavian countries, and certainly not North America.  
Other concerns about a conflict over newly accessible Arctic resources are sim-
ilarly unlikely given the region’s geography and geology. Over 90% of the estimated 
offshore hydrocarbon resources in the Arctic fall within the Arctic states’ own, undis-
puted, Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs), with Russia, Norway, and Alaska possessing 
the lion’s share. There will be no case in the foreseeable future of Russia or any other 
country running out of Arctic hydrocarbons to extract, and so looking to annex other 
regions. Rather, the vast majority of Arctic offshore oil remains untapped because it is 
difficult and expensive to access, and thus unprofitable. Furthermore, Canada and the 
United States announced their intentions on December 20, 2016 to designate their re-
spective Arctic offshores off limits for oil and gas development.  
The idea of taking Arctic resources by force also defies logic. Those large-
scale Arctic developments that have been realized are typically multi-billion-dollar 
capital investments which require decades-long lifespans to reap returns. Investors do 
not and will not fund billion dollar Arctic projects under conditions of significant geo-
political uncertainty, for example where territory is under dispute. It is therefore in eve-
ryone’s economic interest to maintain a peaceful and stable Arctic region which is rules-
based and predictable.  
It is also difficult to imagine a scenario in which military tactics would serve 
any states’ Arctic interests. The vast majority of the region is inhospitable, dangerous, 
and generally inaccessible. Some kind of large-scale land-based acquisition is thus in-
conceivable, as for the most part there is nothing to take and nowhere to occupy. As 
former Canadian Chief of Defense Staff, General Walt Natynczyk, articulated in 2009, 
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“If someone were to invade the Canadian Arctic, my first task would be to rescue them” 
(as quoted in Byers 2014, 9). 
Norwegian General Sverre Diesen identified the most likely scenarios for actu-
al military conflict in the Arctic at a conference in 2008. While maintaining that “we see 
no threat, in the conventional military meaning of the word” of military force in the 
region, in theory such an event would most likely be an “air- or sea-launched raid, pos-
sibly against an objective of military or economic value, but with extraction of force as 
soon as desired effect had been achieved”. Diesen also assessed sustained military pres-
ence in the region as more “a visible expression of national interests and claims than as 




The case for exceptionality of Arctic society rests primarily on the close and resilient 
cooperation between Russia and the other seven Arctic states, despite clashes in inter-
ests elsewhere. How do we account for that? 
Russia’s foremost strategic interest in the Arctic is to develop its resources. Re-
source development has propelled the Russian Arctic to contribute as much as 20% of 
Russian GDP (Medvedev 2008) when oil prices are high, and over 70% of the Arctic 
region’s GRP (Glomsrød et al 2017, 28); Russia’s Arctic produced 70% of the country’s 
oil and 90% of its gas in 2012 (Glomsrød et al 2017, 62). This is in sharp contrast to 
Canada, Denmark, and the United States’ respective ‘Arctics’ (defined as Canada’s 
three territories; Greenland and Alaska), which represent < 1% of national GDP. This 
makes the Arctic much more important to Russia than to its potential competitors, and 
also makes Russia the most invested in a stable and prosperous Arctic. Russia needs 
foreign investment, expertise, and markets to profit from its Arctic resources, particular-
ly with offshore oil drilling. The sanctions imposed by Western countries over Crimea 
have been harmful to these efforts. Outright conflict would be paralyzing.  
According to Valery Konyshev and Alexander Sergunin (2014, 2), it would not 
make sense for Russia to “pursue a revisionist policy in the Arctic” because it is “a sta-
tus quo power” in the region. Although much has been written and speculated about 
Russian investments in their Arctic military capabilities, they are often described as 
‘modernization programs’ designed to retrieve some of its capabilities in the Soviet era. 
Konyshev and Sergunin argue (2014, 2) that these “programs are quite modest and aim 
at upgrading the Russian armed forces in the High North rather than providing them 
with additional offensive capabilities or provoking a regional arms race”.  
This is not to say that conflict in the Arctic with Russia is impossible, even as it 
is unlikely. However, Russia’s militarization of the region appears to be more focused 
on domestic political interests than being outwardly aggressive. There have been no 
overt violations of existing agreements, no military skirmishes, and no posturing that 
would appear to indicate Russia, or any other Arctic state, is on the verge of initiating 
conflict. Rather than fearing Russia’s behavior in the Arctic, it is incumbent on other 
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Arctic states to engage with Russia and use the Arctic as an avenue for dialogue and 
cooperation, rather than to engage in arms racing behavior or escalation tactics that 
would erode the existing diplomatic normative character of Arctic international society. 
 
Great Powers, English School, and Arctic Exceptionalism 
 
Returning to Hedley Bull and the English School (Bull 2002, 200), how can we best 
understand persistence of peace and stability in Arctic society? The key to understand-
ing how an international society functions, is found, as noted above, in the institutions 
negotiated by the states involved in a society of states, indicating their normative pref-
erences and structure for a society at a given time in history. By examining the primary 
institutions of Arctic international society, the exceptional trends of the region become 
clearer:  
 
1. An Arctic Balance of Power: Despite the media hype around new military in-
vestments in the Arctic, it is generally agreed that they have not fundamentally 
altered the regional balance power, or as George Soroka describes it, “the other 
regional states have not yet seen a need to balance against Moscow” (as quoted 
in Exner-Pirot 2017). Indeed, the United States has let much of its Arctic capa-
bilities diminish, especially in terms of ice-breaking power. While Moscow ap-
pears to be investing more heavily, as described above it is not aimed at provid-
ing Russia with provoking a regional arms race or establishing Russia as a re-
gional hegemon. Other Arctic states have responded by investing in their own 
capabilities, but not to the extent that the Arctic balance of power is predicated 
on balancing against Russian power in the region.  
 
2. Arctic Diplomacy: Even though there have been difficult moments, all of the 
Arctic states, including the United States and Russia, have been very deliberate 
in articulating that the Arctic is a region of cooperation and that this must not 
change, which has been reinforced by their actions. In spite of economic sanc-
tions, Arctic-specific collaboration including fisheries, shipping, scientific coop-
eration and SAR, has been ongoing since the annexation of Crimea, and the 
work of the Arctic Council has not been affected in any explicit way. Much em-
phasis is placed on ‘dialogue’ and a regional commitment to multilateralism and 
cooperation.  
 
3. Emphasis on International Law: Though the Arctic Council does not discuss 
military matters, and the ad hoc meetings of the Arctic Chiefs of Staff were sus-
pended after March 2014, confidence building measures such as the establish-
ment and activities of the Arctic Coast Guard Forum have continued. Russia has 
been actively settling its boundary disputes, and the threat they pose to stability, 
with its successful delimitation of its Barents Sea maritime boundary with Nor-
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way in 2010, and through the orderly delimitation of its extended continental 
shelf via the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS). In fact, 
Russia has restricted its submission to the CLCS to the shelf largely to the east-
ern hemisphere, with its claim to the Lomonosov Ridge ending close to the 
North Pole (Russian Federation 2015). Denmark’s submission, by contrast, goes 
deep in to the Eastern, or Russian, side (Kingdom of Denmark 2014).   
 
4. Role of Arctic States: States remain the primary actors and decision-makers in 
Arctic international society, but they have consciously chosen to allow elements 
of world society to significantly influence decisions and multilateral bodies that 
are key components of the way the Arctic works. NGOs, Indigenous groups, and 
civil society are important actors in explaining how decisions in the Arctic are 
made by states, which has helped to influence the cooperative structure of the 
Arctic society of states.  
 
5. War: While it is the case that narratives around Arctic conflict, competition and 
a ‘race’ for the region are exaggerated, it is important to note that the Arctic is 
not immune from states acting to assert or protect their interests, and that ongo-
ing militarization of the region can affect how willing states are to maintain an 
institutional framework for Arctic international society based on cooperation. 
War has been used historically by international societies as a means of establish-
ing and protecting order and the balance of power, and as Arctic international 
society continues to evolve, great power management must have the option as a 
means of deterring states from disrupting the institutional structure of the region 




Arctic international society has been framed as a unique, or even exceptional, region in 
that it has exhibited resilience to the clashing of interests that have pervaded Russia’s 
relations with the West elsewhere during the post-Cold War period. For international 
relations theorists in the realist camp, this state of affairs is seen as highly tenuous, with 
competition and conflict stemming from unsettled boundaries, large and newly accessi-
ble reserves of oil and other resources, strategic location, and the presence of both a 
superpower in the United States and a revisionist great power in Russia, overdue to im-
pact Arctic relations. This paper has argued that the English School of international re-
lations better explains the current state of affairs in the Arctic, which continues to be 
marked by cooperation and stability.   
The Arctic states have negotiated a rules- and norms- based order that serves 
all parties’ interests well. A regional international society has been founded on envi-
ronmental protection and marine cooperation, both issues where states seek absolute, 
not relative gains. It is marked by extensive non-state actor cooperation, particularly 
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amongst Indigenous peoples, scientists, and NGOs, which has served to moderate the 
impact of fluctuations in state relations elsewhere. Russia in particular, with its econom-
ic dependence on hydrocarbon and mineral exports from its Arctic region, is vested in a 
stable and predictable regional order. There are no obvious strategic goals that could be 
accomplished through military means in the Arctic. 
The establishment over the past thirty years of a robust Arctic international so-
ciety has not made the region immune to inter-state competition and conflict. It is in-
cumbent upon the Arctic states to continue to be proactive in maintaining and strength-
ening the values, norms and institutional framework that have made it exceptional in 
contemporary international relations. But there is a recognition amongst all stakeholders 
that the nature of regional Arctic relations is worthy of protection; as a model of interna-
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